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BRING ON 'DA NOISE: THE SEC'S PROPOSALS
CONCERNING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS
UNDER SARBANES-OXLEY
BY MARILYN BLUMBERG CANE* AND SARAH SMITH KELLEHER"
ABSTRACT
In the wake of Enron's and numerous other corporate scandals,
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which empowered the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the Commission) to establish rules of
professional conduct for attorneys who appear before it. In November
2002, the Commission released a proposal where attorneys would be
required to report perceived violations of corporate governance and
Commission rules "up-the-ladder." Additionally, if the company failed to
make an appropriate response, the attorney would be required to make a
"noisy withdrawal." After an onslaught of comments against the proposal,
the Commission issued an alternative proposal for comment.
Under the alternative rule, the issuer, rather than the attorney,
would be responsible for notifying the Commission of an attorney's
withdrawal. The alternative rule has sparked afair amount of controversy.
Many support the rule as consistent with the Commission's duty under
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and necessary to effectuate "up-the-
ladder" reporting. Others oppose the alternative rule because they believe
the rule is in conflict with attorney-client privilege rules.
The alternative rule will aid in the restoration of market integrity by
granting corporate attorneys the ability to call public attention to
violations of securities laws without destroying the attorney-client
privilege. Because the reason for adopting rules concerning professional
conduct of attorney is ultimately to protect the investing public, placing the
burden of disclosure on the issuer, rather than the attorney, will result in
sufficient disclosure to put the public on notice of serious problems. As a
result, corporate executives and accountants will be less likely to enter into
fraudulent transactions on behalf of the issuer.
'Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law School of Nova Southeastern University; B.A.,
Cornell University; J.D., Boston College.
-B.A., University of Virginia; J.D., Shepard Broad Law School of Nova Southeastern
University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The collapse of Enron and numerous other corporate scandals of late
have delivered an immense blow to consumer confidence and the "integrity
of the securities and other markets that make American capitalism work."'
Investors no longer trust corporations or their highly compensated
executives. Corporate executives, however, are not solely to blame. As
evidenced in the obstruction ofjustice charges against Arthur Andersen, the
accountants entrusted with auditing corporations were easily swayed by the
power of the almighty dollar. Along with greedy executives and less-than-
honest accountants, the frauds that these companies perpetrated could not
have been accomplished without the assistance of lawyers.2 Corporate
transactions require the work of lawyers. Thus, without significant reforms
to the rules of professional responsibility of lawyers, other reforms will
have no significant impact.'
In response to the corporate scandals and behavior of lawyers
involved, the American Bar Association convened a Task Force on
Professional Responsibility to consider revisions to the Model Rules. In its
Preliminary Report, the Task Force states:
[E]videnced by recent failures of corporate responsibility, the
exercise by such independent participants of active and
informed stewardship of the best interests of the corporation
has in too many instances fallen short. Unless the governance
system is changed in ways designed to encourage such active
and informed stewardship, . . . public trust and investor
confidence in the corporate governance system will not be
restored.4
Thus, the rules that govern attorney behavior must be adjusted to restore
confidence and integrity to the marketplace.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) is
empowered to prescribe "minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in
'Roger C. Crampton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal Ethical
Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143, 144 (2002).
2 d.
31d.
'ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Preliminary Report of the American Bar
Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 58 Bus. LAW. 189, 194 (2002).
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the representation of issuers."5 Such standards must include requirements
for "up-the-ladder" reporting, "requiring an attorney to report evidence of
a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation" by notifying the chief legal officer or the chief executive officer.6
If such officers do not respond, the attorney must report violations to the
audit committee, a committee of independent directors, or the full board of
directors.7 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act thus required the Commission to
address previously sacrosanct attorney-client privilege and confidentiality
issues along with well-established means for attorney discipline.
In response, on November 6, 2002, the SEC Commissioners voted
to adopt a rule that significantly affected attorney-client relationships.' As
first proposed, the Commission mandated not only that attorneys report
perceived violations of corporate governance and SEC rules "up-the-
ladder"9 but also that attorneys effect a "noisy withdrawal" by reporting to
the Commission and withdrawing from the representation if the company
did not make an "appropriate response."'" The "noisy withdrawal"
provisions were not mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; however, as the
Commission stated in its press release, such requirements "are important
components of an 'up the ladder' reporting system." 1
In this proposed rule, "Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys" dated November 21, 2002 2 (the First Proposed
Rule), the Commission stated that "while the Commission has opined on a
case-by-case basis that lawyers appearing and practicing before the
Commission have an obligation to report corporate misconduct to
appropriate officers and directors, it has not adopted comprehensive
standards directing attorneys to report instances of misconduct." 3 Under
5Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
6Securities and Exchange Commission, "Implementation of Standards of Professional
conduct for Attorneys," 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003).71d.
"SEC Proposes Rules to Implement Sarbanes-Oxley Act Provisions Concerning Standards
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SEC News Release 02-158, 2002 WL 31474838 (S.E.C.)
(Nov. 6, 2002).
9
"The proposed rule would also provide an alternative system for reporting evidence of
material violations." See 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (2002) (SEC Release Nos. 8150, 46868, 33-8150,
34-46868). Issuers may, but are not required to, establish a qualified legal compliance committee
composed of "at least one member of the issuer's audit committee, and two or more independent
members of the issuer's board" for the purpose of investigating reports of material violations made
by attorneys. Id.
1Id.
1id.
2See supra note 9.
31d. at *5.
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the First Proposed Rule, the Commission discussed the "noisy withdrawal"
and disaffirmation obligations of an attorney who had not received an
"appropriate response" from the issuer in instances of "material violation"
of the Commission's rules.
The First Proposed Rule distinguished between an issuer's retained
attorneys (those outside the issuer firm) and employed attorneys (those
within the firm). Outside attorneys, who made reports but did not receive
appropriate responses, were required to withdraw (with notice to the
Commission) and disaffirm any previous, "tainted" work submitted to the
Commission if the attorneys believed that the reported violation was
ongoing or about to occur, and was likely to result in serious financial
injury. 4 Inside attorneys acting under similar beliefs, however, while still
required to disaffirm any tainted submissions, did not have to resign. 5
Under the First Proposed Rule, when an attorney reasonably believed
that a material violation had already occurred and would have no ongoing
effect, the attorney was permitted to take similar steps as long as the
attorney also reasonably believed that the reported material violation likely
caused substantial injury to the financial interest of the issuer or investors.' 6
Finally, an attorney formerly employed or retained by an
issuer who reasonably believed that he or she had been
discharged because he or she fulfilled the reporting obligation
imposed by the First Proposed Rule was given the option, but
was not required, to notify the Commission of his or her belief
that he or she was discharged for reporting evidence of a
material violation and also to disaffirm in writing any
submission to the Commission that he or she participated in
preparing that was tainted by the violation. 7
The First Proposed Rule Release stated simply and emphatically that "[a]
notification to the Commission under this section does not breach the
attorney-client privilege."' 8
In discussing the "noisy withdrawal" proposal in the First Proposed
Rule, the Commission logically stated:
'
41d. at *8.
1 5d.
'
61d
.
'
71d.
"'See 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (2002). This view was hotly contested by many commentators.
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The limited disclosure involved in the "noisy withdrawal"
required by Section 205.3(d) should provide such a powerful
incentive for an issuer to take actions appropriate to prevent
or rectify a material violation that such "noisy withdrawals"
should be rare. Requiring such "noisy withdrawal" appears
appropriate to protect shareholders and investors, where the
reported material violation appears likely to result in
substantial financial injury to the issuer or investors, by
effectively requiring an issuer's directors to act and by
virtually ensuring an immediate inquiry by the Commission if
they do not. 9
The hue and cry that followed the First Proposed Rule was loud and
immediate. On November 25, 2002, "[tlhirty prominent securities lawyers
... told the Securities and Exchange Commission in no uncertain terms that
key portions of a proposed rule to mandate that public company lawyers
report evidence of their client corporations' securities law violations would
impair those lawyers' ability to render independent legal advice.""0 The
letter, signed by former SEC Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman on
behalf of himself and twenty-nine other lawyers, stated that "the rule
proposal would 'demean and directly undermine' zealous representation."'"
What followed were hundreds of comments to the SEC,22 the majority
coming from attorneys. Many criticized the "noisy withdrawal" proposals.
On January 23, 2003, the Commission backed off its earlier stance
of requiring or permitting "noisy withdrawal" to extend the period for
comment on these particular rules. As it stated in its press release, "[g]iven
the significance and complexity of the issues involved, including the
implications of a reporting out requirement on the relationship between
issuers and their counsel, the Commission decided to continue to seek
comment and give thoughtful consideration to these issues."23 The
Commission is still considering the "noisy withdrawal" provisions. On
January 23, 2003, the Commission also proposed an alternative to the
"noisy withdrawal" rule, which would place the burden of reporting the
attorney's withdrawal on the issuer, rather than the attorney.
191d.
2 Securities Law Daily Highlights, Nov. 29, 2002.
2lid.
22The comments on the proposed rules that have been filed electronically are available
at http://www.sec.gov/ruIes/proposed/s74502.shtml. At the time this article was submitted for
publication, there were a total of 252 comments filed on the website. Id.
2 Securities and Exchange Commission 03-13, 2003 WL 164827 (S.E.C.) (Jan. 23,
2003).
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Under the alternative proposal, the attorney would not be required
to disaffirm documents filed with the Commission. Instead, the issuer
would disclose the attorney's withdrawal on Form 8-K, 20-F, or 40-F, as
applicable. If the issuer failed to promptly submit such a filing, the
attorney would be permitted to inform the Commission of the issuers'
failure to disclose.24
The alternative "noisy withdrawal" rule has sparked a fair amount of
controversy. Many support the rule as consistent with the Commission's
mandate under Section 307 considering it necessary to effectuate the "up-
the-ladder" reporting rule. The alternative proposal addresses the situation
where an issuer inappropriately refuses to implement remedial measures.
Numerous commentators, however, oppose the proposal because they feel
the provision is in conflict with state ethics laws. These authors believe
that the alternative proposal will aid in the restoration of market integrity
by granting corporate attorneys the ability to call public attention to such
dealings without destroying the attorney-client privilege. As a result,
corporate executives and accountants will be less likely to enter into
fraudulent transactions on behalf of the reporting company.
This article will argue that the alternative "noisy withdrawal"
provision of the Commission rules, if implemented, will dissuade corporate
executives from entering into fraudulent transactions. First, this article will
discuss the objective of the provision, including the benefits and problems
associated with requiring issuers to disclose an attorney's withdrawal.
Second, the article will argue that the alternative provision will not affect
attorney-client privileges or confidentiality principles. Third, the article
will compare the disclosure requirements regarding auditors and the
requirements under bankruptcy law to the proposed rule for attorneys.
II. THE ALTERNATIVE "NOISY WITHDRAWAL" RULE
The Commission's alternative "noisy withdrawal" rule places the
burden of disclosure on the issuer.25 In doing so, the Commission believes
24Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Rules, "Implementation of Standards
on Professional Conduct for Attorneys," 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (Feb. 6, 2003).
2 Sections 205.3(d) through (f) provide the following:
(d) Actions required where there is no appropriate response within a
reasonable time.
(1) Where an attorney who has reported evidence of a material violation
under paragraph (b) of this section rather than paragraph (c) of this section:
(i) Does not receive an appropriate response, or has not received an
appropriate response in a reasonable time,
(ii) Has followed the procedures set forth in paragraph (b)(3) ofthis section,
and
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that it has responded to the numerous concerns of the original "noisy
withdrawal" rule. "Requiring issuers to report attorney withdrawals in a
public filing with the Commission may also provide protection to investors
by alerting them to the possibility of ongoing material violations by
issuers."26
The alternative proposal does not contain "noisy
withdrawal" and disaffirmation requirements and requires
attorney action only where the attorney reasonably concludes
that there is substantial evidence that a material violation is
(iii) Reasonably concludes that there is substantial evidence of a material
violation that is ongoing or about to occur and is likely to cause substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or of investors:
(A) An attorney retained by the issuer shall withdraw from representing the
issuer, and shall notify the issuer, in writing, that the withdrawal is based on
professional considerations.
(B) An attorney employed by the issuer shall cease forthwith any
participation or assistance in any matter concerning the violation and shall notify
the issuer, in writing, that he or she believes that the issuer has not provided an
appropriate response in a reasonable time to his or her report of evidence of a
material violation under paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) An attorney shall not be required to take any action pursuant to
paragraph (d)(1) of this section if the attorney would be prohibited from doing
so by order or rule of any court, administrative body or other authority with
jurisdiction over the attorney, after having sought leave to withdraw from
representation or to cease participation or assistance in a matter. An attorney
shall give notice to the issuer that, but for such prohibition, he or she would have
taken such action pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) or (d)(2), and such notice shall
be deemed the equivalent of such action for purposes of this part.
(3) An attorney employed or retained by an issuer who has reported
evidence of a material violation under this part and reasonably believes that he
or she has been discharged for so doing shall notify the issuer's chief legal
officer (or the equivalent thereof) forthwith.
(4) The issuer's chief legal officer (or equivalent thereof) shall notify any
attorney retained or employed to replace an attorney who has given notice to an
issuer pursuant to paragraph (d)(1), (d)(2) or (d)(3) of this section that the
previous attorney has withdrawn, ceased to participate or assist or has been
discharged, as the case may be, pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph.
(e) Duties of an issuer where an attorney has given notice pursuant to
paragraph (d). Where an attorney has provided an issuer with a written notice
pursuant to paragraph (d)(1), (d)(2) or (d)(3) of this section, the issuer shall,
within two business days of receipt of such written notice report such notice and
the circumstances related thereto on Form 8-K, 20-F, or 40-F, as applicable.
(f) Additional actions by an attorney. An attorney retained or employed
by the issuer may, if an issuer does not comply with paragraph (e) of this
section, inform the Commission that the attorney has provided the issuer with
notice pursuant to paragraph (d)(1), (d)(2) or (d)(3) of this section, indicating
that such action was based on professional considerations.
See id. at 6335-36 (citation omitted).
261d. at 6329.
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ongoing or about to occur and is likely to cause substantial
injury to the issuer.27
Upon learning of evidence of a material violation, and after reporting such
evidence "up-the-ladder" without appropriate response, the attorney
retained by the issuer must notify the issuer in writing that his withdrawal
is based on professional reasons. An attorney employed by the issuer must
stop participating in any matter concerning the violation and must notify
the issuer of his belief that the issuer has not taken appropriate measures.2S
The Commission states that an objective for the alternative proposal
"is to provide notice of such an event to both the Commission and the
public without unduly intruding on the attorney-client relationship."29 It
accomplishes the Commission's objective and proves to be better than the
original proposal of "noisy withdrawal." It is also much more likely to be
accepted by the legal community.
A. Benefits of the Alternative Proposal
1. Increased Disclosure to Investors
The primary role of the Securities and Exchange Commission is to
protect investors by requiring disclosure of company information. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act expressly requires rules to be "in the public interest
and for the protection of investors."' The best way the Commission can
protect investors is by increasing public disclosure of potential material
violations of securities laws. The alternative "noisy withdrawal" provision
fits squarely within the mission of the Commission by increasing company
disclosure to investors. Thus, the rule empowers the investor to determine
what the attorney's withdrawal means within the context of his or her
personal investing objectives.
Without significant changes, the existing system of professional
responsibility would continue to be inadequate in meeting the needs of the
securities market. The alternative proposal is necessary to correct a long-
271d. at 6328.
"Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Rules, "Implementation of Standards
on Professional Conduct for Attorneys," 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6328 (Feb. 6, 2003).
29 1d.
3 Securities and Exchange Commission, 'Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys," 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003).
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standing deficiency in the enforcement of professional conduct of
attorneys3 '-primarily, a lack of federal ethics rules.
The proposed rules seek to promote the investor protection goals of
federal securities laws.32 Sarbanes-Oxley "seeks to vindicate the public
interest in compliance with laws protecting shareholders and other public
investors."33 In his comments, Professor Stephen Bundy noted that "the
language and context of the statute both indicate that the preferred
mechanism for achieving compliance is to activate mechanisms... through
which the issuer and its managers can fulfill their obligations to ensure
compliance with governing law."34 Therefore, the primary benefit of the
alternative rule is increased disclosure by the issuer. Such disclosure is
best facilitated by the issuer, rather than the individual attorney or law firm
involved, because the issuer is already responsible for disclosure of its
business practices. It seems to be a natural progression to require the issuer
to report the withdrawal of counsel under the alternative proposal.
2. Uniform Professional Conduct Standards
The "up-the-ladder" reporting rules and the alternative proposal offer
a federal standard for attorneys and issuers appearing before the
Commission. Attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission
should be regulated by uniform federal standards.3 Securities law creates
a national system upon which the world economy depends. The
Commission "is responsible for the enforcement of securities laws, and
such enforcement should not leave a realm of conduct with such a strong
influence to the states."36
The alternative rule is promulgated under a federal statute.
Additionally, the rules provide a federal standard of professional conduct.
Therefore, the fact that the Commission is drafting rules under a federal
3Comments of William H. Simon, "Proposed Rules on Standard of Professional Conduct
For Attorneys under Section 307 of the Oxley-Sarbanes Act," Dec. 13, 2002.
32Comments of Stephen McG. Bundy, "Standards of Professional Conduct," Oct. 14,
2002.
331d.
34
1d.
35Id
36 Bundy Comments, supra note 32. Some states, however, may resist a movement toward
a uniform federal standard, desiring instead to stringently enforce their own reporting and
disclosure rules. For instance, "The Washington State Bar Association is warning its corporate
lawyers not to disclose client information allowed by new Securities and Exchange commission
regulations unless such disclosures are also permitted by the state's own professional conduct
rules." Mark Hansen, State Fights the SEC, Aug. 29, 2003, available at
http://www.abanet.orgjoumal/ereport/au29sec.html.
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statute, Sarbanes-Oxley, may mean that there is an implied partial
preemption of state ethics rules.
A federal standard is necessary for the Commission to regulate in an
intelligible, coherent manner." The transactions that the Commission
regulates involve multiple states. When an ethical issue arises, the choice
of law provisions that determine which state's ethics rules apply to such
interstate transactions are sometimes ambiguous and often capricious. For
example, the rules typically default to the jurisdiction where the attorney
is licensed. The licensing jurisdiction, however, should not be
determinative over federal matters.3"
Therefore, by implementing a federal standard of professional
conduct and increasing public disclosure of potential violations of
securities laws, the alternative proposal is a beneficial addition to the
guidelines that govern securities industry professionals and issuers.
B. Problems With the Alternative Proposal Voiced by Commentators
Despite its potential benefits, the alternative "noisy withdrawal"
proposal still suffers from several problems in the eyes of commentators.
First, the proposed rule fails to clarify what happens when an attorney
responds unreasonably. Second, the rule does not address what happens if
the evidence has been referred to the issuer's qualified legal compliance
committee. Third, the rule places no limits on an attorney's obligation to
withdraw. Fourth, the proposal does not provide for instances where the
issuer is permitted not to disclose the attorney's withdrawal. Fifth, the rule
does not prevent the issuer from making a preemptive discharge of the
attorney. Finally, the alternative proposal does not specify whether
disclosure to the Commission will be public or private.
1. Unreasonable Attorney Withdrawal
The first potential problem is the attorney who withdraws
unreasonably or overly hastily. There is a potential problem that an
attorney may withdraw unnecessarily and to the detriment of the issuer for
fear of losing his license to practice. While an attorney will have the duty
"See Remarks by Senator Michael Enzi, 148 Cong. Rec. at S6555:
I am usually in the camp that believes States should regulate professionals within
their jurisdiction. However, in this case, the [s]tate bars as a whole have failed.
They have provided no specific ethical rule of conduct to remedy this kind of
situation. Even if they do have a general rule that applies, it often goes
unenforced.
3 Simon Comments, supra note 31.
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to withdraw under certain circumstances, those circumstances might be
rare. The attorney must exhaust the "up-the-ladder" reporting before
withdrawing. Therefore, the vast majority of violations will be rectified
within the walls of the issuer.
The few instances where "up-the-ladder" reporting is not enough will
require the withdrawal of the attorney. By requiring the issuer to disclose
the withdrawal of an attorney, however, the issuer has the opportunity to
explain the circumstances of the withdrawal. An unreasonable withdrawal
will be explained by the issuer. Thus, in the rare case of an overzealous
attorney who withdraws prematurely, the issuer will retain the power to
disclose the withdrawal in its own words-not the words of the
withdrawing attorney, as in the originally proposed "noisy withdrawal"
rule.
2. The Role of the Qualified Legal Compliance Committee
The second potential issue arises when the evidence of a material
violation has been referred to the issuer's qualified legal compliance
committee (a QLCC). A QLCC is a committee of independent directors
with the requisite authority to initiate an investigation and recommend
appropriate action for the issuer to take. The rule would not apply to
attorneys who reported evidence of material violations to an issuer's QLCC.
The rule fails to explain, however, whether an exemption also applies to an
attorney who reports a material violation to the chief legal officer or the
chief executive officer who, in turn, refers the report to the QLCC.
Commentators have argued that attorneys in this situation should be
exempt from the rule.39 In theory, an attorney has responded appropriately
by reporting "up-the-ladder." Whether the attorney must withdraw will
depend on the individual circumstances and how the QLCC responds.
Therefore, while the rule does not expressly address this sort of situation,
the withdrawal of an attorney and the subsequent disclosure by the issuer
will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
3. Limits on the Obligation to Withdraw
The third issue concerns whether there are limits on the attorney's
obligation to withdraw. Commentators have noted that "an unlimited
withdrawal obligation would be unreasonable and unduly disruptive to
9Comments of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, "Re: Proposed Rule:
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorney," Apr. 1, 2003, at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/skaddenl.htm.
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companies that retain law firms to handle a diverse array of matters, many
of which are unrelated to the securities laws, fiduciary duties or similar
laws."4 ° The law firm of Skadden, Arps has noted that if the attorney must
"withdraw from all matters in which it represents the issuer, a significant
portion of the issuer's legal work could come to a standstill and cause
irreparable harm to the issuer and its shareholders."'"
As an alternative, Skadden, Arps proposes that the rule require
withdrawal only from matters where the material violation relates and
matters where the attorney is appearing and practicing before the
Commission.42 Due to the complexity and breadth of securities law,
however, any matter related to the issuer may be related to a material
violation; separating matters when an attorney may still participate will be
extremely difficult. Additionally, disclosure of the partial withdrawal of an
attorney may mask significant violations by an issuer. Therefore, if an
attorney is in a situation where he must withdraw, such withdrawal must be
complete.
4. Instances When Disclosure is Not Required by Issuer
The fourth issue is whether there are circumstances where the issuer
is permitted not to disclose the attorney's withdrawal. Under the alternative
proposal, the issuer must disclose any withdrawals related to the issuer's
failure to respond to "up-the-ladder" reporting of material violations of
securities laws. The attorneys must makejudgments as to whether they are
aware of evidence of material violations. They must also determine
whether the issuer has responded appropriately. These judgments will be
difficult to make and may run the risk of being second-guessed by the
Commission.43 Once these decisions are made, however, the issuer will
have the responsibility to report the withdrawal if it relates to a material
violation. The issuer will not have the opportunity to pick and choose
which attorney-withdrawals it will disclose. It must disclose all attorney-
withdrawals surrounding potential material violations.
5. Preemptive Strikes Against the Potential Withdrawal of Attorney
The fifth issue is whether the rule will prevent the issuer from
preemptively discharging an attorney before he has the opportunity to
401d.
4]"d.
421d.
43Skadden, Arps Comments, supra note 39.
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withdraw. Under the current proposal, there is no provision that prevents
an issuer from discharging the attorney before he can withdraw, thereby
avoiding the responsibility of disclosure. This is an issue that the
Commission must address.
6. Whether the Disclosure Must Be Private or Public
The Commission requested comments on whether the issuer's
dis.closure of an attorney's withdrawal must be made publicly or
confidentially to the Commission. The law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell
believes that disclosure should be confidential so that "the issuer and the
Commission can come to an understanding regarding the relevant facts free
of an atmosphere of turmoil caused by disclosure to the public.""' This
private disclosure to the Commission, however, fails to further the goal of
Sarbanes-Oxley to promote transparency in corporate operations. The
withdrawal of an attorney must be disclosed publicly if the alternative
proposal is to have any effect on investor confidence.
There are potential problems with the alternative proposal to "noisy
withdrawal." These problems, however, are minor in comparison to the
problems of maintaining the status quo. It is important to recognize that
there is no perfect rule. Despite its best efforts, there will be difficulties
with any promulgated rule. Therefore, the Commission must promulgate
the best rule under the current circumstances. In the current climate, the
best rule is the alternative proposal.
III. THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
AND CONFIDENTIALITY
A. When Disclosure Beyond the Client Should Be Required
The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility provide that an
attorney "may not counsel or assist a client in conduct that is criminal or
fraudulent."4 If the Model Rules are to be interpreted to mean what they
say, a lawyer is forbidden from disclosing confidential information either
to prevent or rectify fraud on a third person, even when the lawyer learns
of the fraud and it involves the use of the lawyer's services. The comments,
however, permit a lawyer to "disaffirm documents"--such as legal opinions
"'Comments of Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, "Re: Proposed Rules Relating to
Implementation of Standard of Professional Conduct for Attorneys," Apr. 7, 2003, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/sullivan040703.htm.
41MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 11 (1998).
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prepared for a client-"that are being, or will be, used in furtherance of the
fraud, even though such a 'noisy' withdrawal may have the collateral effect
of inferentially revealing client confidences."46
Forty-one states, however, have not adopted Model Rule 1.6 as
recommended by the ABA. 7 Rather, these "[florty-one states permit a
lawyer to disclose confidential information to prevent a client's criminal
fraud."4 Some states even require such disclosure.49 In those states where
the lawyer is permitted to disclose criminal fraud, Rule 4.1 is given
additional strength. Because disclosure is permitted, a lawyer must "not
knowingly . . . fail to disclose a material [fact to a third person] when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a
client."50 Therefore, in reality, this rule creates an affirmative duty of
disclosure.
B. Whether the Alternative Noisy Withdrawal Rule
Will Violate Confidentiality Provisions
The primary concerns of commentators appear to surround
confidentiality. Confidentiality interests of the corporate client, however,
are not infringed by the attorney disclosure under the alternate proposal.
It is universally understood that the attorney for a corporation represents
the organization." The attorney does not represent the officers or the
board. "The organization speaks through agents, but the instructions of
agents can be attributed to the organization only when the agent is acting
within his or her authority. 52
Moreover, the attorney-client privilege only applies to
communications between lawyers and clients. The privilege does not apply
to underlying facts. In keeping with the privilege, "It]he Commission is not
asking issuers to describe the back and forth between lawyer and client on
"
6Crampton, supra note 1, at 156 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl
Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992)).
"'Id. at 157 (citing Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., Ethics Rules on Client
Confidences (2001), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND OTHER
SELECTED STANDARDS 134-44 (2002)).
'
2 ld.
491d.
50Crampton, supra note I, at 157 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF L CONDUCT R. 4. 1 (b)
(2002)).
"Simon Comments, supra note 31.
521d.
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the matter that was the subject of the report."" The Commission asks for
two things from issuers:
One, a statement that the lawyer has resigned, whenever a
resignation is received in connection with this rule; and two,
a statement that the lawyer's resignation was in connection
with the following matter, including a brief description of the
matter, with no requirement that the issuer repeat or disclose
any of what the lawyer actually said about the matter.
54
The alternative proposed rule deals with situations where the
attorney reasonably believes that the issuer's agents are engaged in material
violations of securities laws, and that the officers and the board failed to
take appropriate action. The issuer is the only holder of the attorney-client
privilege. In other words, the issuer's officers and directors have no
authority to assert the organization's confidentiality rights.55 The attorney
must make a decision whether it is in the interest of the client corporation
to waive confidentiality. Thus, the attorney's duty to withdraw under the
rule would not only be consistent with the attorney's duty of loyalty to the
client, but would arise from the duty.
There is no reason to assume that the professional conduct standards
imposed by the alternative rule would substantially reduce contact between
corporate agents and the attorney. "[T]he idea that'noisy withdrawal' or the
alternative's 'circumstances' provision would suddenly result in clients not
talking to their lawyers seems untenable. Corporate clients (through their
agents) confide in corporate lawyers... because corporations need legal
advice."56 Thus, it behooves an officer or director to continue consulting
with counsel even though he is not the client.
Moreover, the communications involved are often from those
seeking advice on how to evade the law. Advice regarding destruction or
concealment of evidence that may be material to future claims should not
be protected. As such, the alternative rule is in keeping with the attorney's
duties under the rules of professional conduct. According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, a person who discovers new information
"Comments of Sonia Koniak et al., "Re: Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards
of Professional Conduct for Attorney," Apr. 7, 2003, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502/lawprofsO4O7O3.htm.
541d.
561d.
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that makes a former disclosure untrue is under a duty to make disclosures
needed to rectify the situation."
IV. COMPARISON TO ISSUER'S REQUIREMENTS REGARDING AUDITORS
AND UNDER BANKRUPTCY LAWS
A. Similarity to Issuer's Duty to Disclose Disagreements with Auditors
In 1985, the Commission requested comments on the practice of
opinion shopping by an issuer selecting auditors. "'[O]pinion shopping' is
generally understood to involve the search for an auditor willing to support
a proposed accounting treatment designed to help a company achieve its
reporting objectives even though that treatment might frustrate reliable
reporting." '' After reviewing comments, the Commission issued rules
mandating the disclosure of registrant's auditors and any changes in
auditors. Additionally, the Commission's rules require disclosure of
disagreements between the issuer and the auditor. 9
"Disagreements" include any difference of opinion on "any matter
of accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure, or
auditing scope or procedures which (if not resolved to the satisfaction of
the former accountant) would have caused it to make reference to the
subject matter of the disagreement in connection with its report."6
Preliminary differences of opinion based on incomplete facts are not
disagreements within this rule.
Additionally, the Commission requires disclosure of "reportable
events"; such events "involve situations where the accountant has advised
the registrant that it questions the accuracy or reliability of the registrant's
financial statements, management's representations, the registrant's internal
controls, or prior audits."'"
"Disagreements" and "reportable events" are similar; they both
"involve situations where the position of management may be considered
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (2)(c).
58Disclosure Amendments to Regulation S-K, Form 8-K and Schedule 14A Regarding
Changes in Accountants and Potential Opinion Shopping Situations, Release No. 37-6766, 1988
SEC LEXIS 722 (Apr. 7, 1988).
"Regulation S-K, Item 304, "Changes in and Disagreements With Accountants on
Accounting and Financial Disclosure," 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (2003); and Regulation S-B, Item
304, "Changes in and Disagreements With Accountants on Accounting and Financial Disclosure,"
17 C.F.R. § 228.304 (2003).
617 C.F.R. § 229.304 (2003).
61Id.
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to be generally at odds with that of the auditor."62 A "disagreement" is a
difference in opinion between auditors and management that is expressed
either orally or in writing. A "reportable event" only requires that the
auditors advise the registrant of its concerns:
If, therefore, the auditor is dismissed, resigns or declines to
stand for re-election before the registrant responds (to either
agree or disagree) to the auditor's concern, the event must be
reported. The auditor may not therefore merely advise the
registrant of its concern and then resign (or be dismissed)
prior to receiving a response from management and walk
away without disclosure of its concerns.63
The requirements surrounding "disagreements" and "reportable events" are
remarkably similar to those found in the alternative rule regarding
"reporting out." Auditor opinions and financial statements are crucial to
the registration process. Therefore, the reliability of the auditor is just as
important as the reliability of an issuer's attorney. If the Commission
requires the issuer to disclose "disagreements" or "reportable events"
regarding the auditors, it naturally follows that the Commission should
require the issuer to disclose the withdrawal of attorneys.
B. Analogous Provisions in Bankruptcy Laws
Federal bankruptcy rules establish that federal law controls the scope
and availability of any claim that a party may exercise. These rules impose
a duty upon debtors to disclose assets and liabilities. For example, Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(b) states "the debtor ... shall file
schedules of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and
expenditures, a schedule of executory contracts and unexpired leases, and
a statement of financial affairs."64 Given such a duty to disclose, the
existence of assets cannot be protected by attorney-client privileges.
The attorney-client privilege is to be "narrow[ly interpreted] ...
because it is in 'derogation of the search for truth."'65 The court in United
States v. White stated that "information... transmitted to an attorney with
the intent that the information will be transmitted to a third party... is not
621d
'
3Regulation S-K, Item 304, supra note 59, at 4.
' 
4FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b) (2003).
65United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Walsh, 623
F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1980)).
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confidential."66 The court held that confidentiality cannot be claimed when
"the information is to be disclosed on documents publicly filed. 67
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit held that information sought to be
protected was not privileged because the debtor was required to disclose
the information.
Similarly, issuers are required to disclose accurate and complete
financial and other information. The documents and conversations that
pertain to registration statements and other filings to the Commission
cannot be considered privileged because these communications deal with
information that must be disclosed publicly. Even though bankruptcy rules
are unique, they correlate with securities laws in that the primary goal is
full and honest disclosure. Thus, similar to bankruptcy, the necessity of
disclosure outweighs the importance of confidentiality.
V. CONCLUSION
The Commission is entrusted with protecting investors and
maintaining the integrity of the markets. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 requires the Commission to prescribe "minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing
before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers."69 The
standards must include a rule that requires an attorney to report "evidence
of a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or
similar violation by the company or any agent thereof'7 to the chief legal
counsel or chief executive officer and further, "up-the-ladder" when
necessary.
The alternative proposal is designed to address situations where the
"up-the-ladder" provisions are not enough. In requiring an issuer to notify
the Commission when an attorney must withdraw, the alternative proposal
restores public confidence by increasing disclosure by issuers without
directly intruding on the attorney-client privilege. The alternative proposal
is less likely to draw fire than its "noisy withdrawal" counterpart from the
Bar. Requiring an issuer to disclose a disagreement with auditors has been
an established SEC rule for more than a decade. The alternative proposal,
requiring disclosure of attorney withdrawal, seems a logical next step.
"Id. at 430 (citing United States v. Lawless, 790 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983)).
671d.
6 United States v. French, 46 F.3d 710, 714-15 (8th Cir. 1995).
"Securities and Exchange Commission, "Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys," 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (2003).
7Id.
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One can only hope that lawyers for publicly traded companies will
prove to be more principled than their counterparts in the accounting
industry. As Judge Friendly presciently remarked, "In our complex society
the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for
inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar."'
Although cogent arguments have been made for requiring attorneys
themselves to report material violations to the SEC under certain limited
circumstances, 72 it is clear that such a requirement would be challenged
vigorously with protracted litigation.
Admittedly, even the alternative proposal's putting the burden of
disclosure on the issuer may draw fire. The alternative, however,
particularly after some of its shortcomings have been addressed, falls
within the realm of disclosure obligations that have been adopted by the
SEC with respect to other professionals. Because the reason for adopting
rules concerning the professional conduct of attorneys is ultimately to
protect the investing public, placing the burden of disclosure on the issuer,
rather than the attorney, will, one hopes, result in enough disclosure to put
the public on notice of serious problems. This disclosure could be
compelled of the issuer without stepping directly into the minefield of
lawyers' ethical obligations. As far as the investing public is concerned,
disclosure itself is far more important than by whom the disclosure is made.
Therefore, the alternative proposal is the best option set forth by the
Commission.
UPDATE
Since this article was written, the American Bar Association has
amended its Model Rules of Professional Conduct
to require lawyers representing organizational clients to report
law violations by officers or employees up the ladder to
higher authorities in the organization in certain circumstances.
The new rules further provide that if internal reporting is
insufficient to protect the client organization from substantial
harm, lawyers may report such wrongdoing to persons outside
the organization.73
"'United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.) cert. deniedsub nom. Howard
v. United States, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
'See, e.g., Simon Comments, supra note 3 1.
"Greg Pease, Attorneys: ABA Amends Model Ethics Rules to Permit Up the Ladder
Reports of Corporate Wrongs, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1358 (2003).
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Revised Model Rule 1.6 permits "a lawyer to reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer believes
necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that would
lead to 'substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another."' 4
Revised Model Rule 1.13 "allows a lawyer who knows that actions
by officers or employees will likely harm the company to refer the matter
to higher-ups 'unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary
in the best interest of the organization to do so.""'
"James Podgers, Corporate Watchdogs: ABA House OKs Rule That Would Allow
Lawyers to Report Financial Wrongdoing, ABA JOURNAL EREPORT (Aug. 15, 2003), at
http://www.abanet.orgtjouma/ereport/au5house.html.
75ld.
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